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WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE: WHY
CONGRESS SHOULD REJECT CURRENT
FINANCIAL REFORM BILLS AND BREATHE
NEW LIFE INTO GLASS-STEAGALL.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the stock market crash,1 Congress enacted the
Glass Steagall Act2 ("Act") to promote consumer confidence in
the United States' banking industry. During that time, Ameri-
can scholars and government leaders believed that the wide-
spread, speculative securities activities of commercial banks
precipitated the stock market's collapse.3 Not surprisingly, the
* This Note was originally drafted in late 1997. Since that time, the legislation dis-
cussed, H.R. 10, passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 214-213 in the 105 th
Congress. The bill proceeded to the Senate and was referred to the Committee on
Banking, where it was ordered reported with an amendment. A motion to proceed to the
Senate passed by a vote of 88-11. The measure was presented before the Senate by
unanimous consent on October 8, 1998. Subsequently, Senator Lott moved to recommit
the measure to the Committee on Banking. The Senator also proposed a few amend-
ments. However, the measure never made it out of the Senate during the 105th Con-
gress. In 1999, at the start of the 106th Congress, Rep. James Leach introduced a bill to
the House that was substantially similar to the previous bill brought before the 105 th
Congress. Representative Leach's bill reflected some Senatorial amendments and con-
cerns. The new form of the bill does not affect the discussion in this Note, because the
two bills in general, and the sections focusing on the mixing of investment and commer-
cial banking specifically, are nearly identical. For the latest update on this legislation,
please see:<http://thomas.loc., ov..>.
1 See Michael P. Kenney & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to
Cover the Corporate Universe: Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV.
139, 146 (1995) (describing how public viewed 1929 stock market crash as cause of great
depression); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1464
(1997) (stating that Congressional and public opinion drew causal link between stock
market crash and Great Depression); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 406 (1990) (expressing
that public sentiment saw 1929 stock market crash as cause of Great Depression).
2 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 227 (1988).
3 See Stephen K Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce Reconsidered,
13 J. CORP. L. 481, 493 (1988) (stating that prohibitions on engagement by commercial
banks in investment banking were enacted to combat banking industry's tendency to in-
cur episodes of bank panic and regional banking collapse); Leon Korobow, Breaking Glass
Steagall Chains, J. OF COM., June 4, 1997, at 8-9 (contending that permissible affiliations
between commercial banks and securities firms had contributed to severity and duration
of collapse of banking systems as well as general economy of that era); Don More, The
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public's faith in banks was shattered and the future of the indus-
try was in peril.4 In an effort to restore the public trust, Con-
gress passed the Glass-Steagall Act,5 which prohibited commer-
cial banks from engaging in securities transactions.6
Since the passage of the Act, significant changes have occurred
that have transformed the financial services industry causing
some to question the Act's viability in modern markets.7 Pres-
ently, the industry's structure is a patchwork of judicial and
Virtues of Glass Steagall: Argument Against Legislative Repeal, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 433, 436 (1991) (stating that public confidence in banks hit rock bottom before pas-
sage of Glass-Steagall); Walter Henry Goodwin, Comment, Fifty-Two Years After the
Glass-Steagall Act: Do Commercial Bank Securities Activities Merit a Second Look?, 1984
DET. C. L. REV. 933, 936 (1984) (stating that Act's objective was to protect bank deposi-
tors from repetition of widespread bank closings that occurred during Great Depression);
Frank M. Tavelman, Note, American Banks or the Glass-Steagall Act- Which Will Go
First? 21 Sw. U.L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1992) (indicating Congressional intent of Banking
Act of 1933 was to provide for safer banking).
4 See Edward D. Sullivan, Glass-Steagall Update: Proposals to Modernize the Struc-
ture of the Financial Services Industry, 112 BANKING L.J. 977, 977 (1995) (stating that
Glass-Steagall Act was passed as emergency mechanism to promote bank soundness); see
also Michael A. Raffanti, Erosion of Subtle Hazards Analysis Jeopardizes Safety and
Soundness of Banking System: Securities Industries Association v. Board of Governors,
30 B.C. L. REV. 937, 937 (1989) (describing how public saw bank abuses as cause of mar-
ket crash, thereby undermining its faith in banking industry); Steven D. Kaye & Jack
Egan et. al., Mega Merger One Stop Shopping is a Mixed Bag for Banking Consumers,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 20, 1998, at 60-62 (explaining that law was introduced to
keep securities firms from using bank deposits to support risky investments).
5 See Melanie L. Fein, The Evolution of Bank Securities Activities, in Securities
Regulation of Banks and Thrifts 1991, at 793, 796 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-6969, 1991) (stating that it is familiar history that Glass-
Steagall was passed to protect public from widespread bank closures that occurred dur-
ing the Great Depression); Nicholas Theodore Nikas, Banking Law-Commercial Paper Is
a Security Under the Glass-Steagall Act-Securities Industry Association v. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System 104 S.Ct. 2979 (1984), 1985 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 799,
800 (1985) (describing how Congress' intent in passing Glass-Steagall was to restore
public confidence in banking industry).
6 See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Great Fall: The Consequences of Repealing the Glass-
Steagall Act, 2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 129, 130 (1995) (arguing that Glass Steagall Act
kept commercial banks out of corporate securities underwriting business); More, supra
note 3, at 435 (contending that Glass-Steagall Act prevented commercial banks from en-
gaging in securities activities through affiliates, practice which led to rampant abuses in
1920's); Jeffrey L. Elverman, Note, Units of Participation in IRA Common Trust Funds
Offered by Commercial Banks: A Violation of the Glass-Steagall Act?, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 745, 748 (1985) (stating that Glass-Steagall attempts to separate commercial and
investment banking industries).
7 See Robert S. Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-Steagall Have for Today's Finan-
cial World?, 95 BANKING L.J. 404, 406 (1978) (characterizing Glass-Steagall as statutory
overkill); William E. Whitesell & Janet F. Kelly, Is the Glass-Steagall Obsolete?, 87
BANKING L.J. 387, 403 (1970) (arguing Glass-Steagall Act is obsolete). See generally
Banker's Trust Agrees to Buy Alex. Brown, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997, at D1 (stating that
Banker's Trust N.Y. Corporation's acquisition of Alex. Brown Inc. is most dramatic result
to date of gradual steps to allow banks to engage in more bank underwriting and trading,
toppling "walls that have separated banks from the brokerage industry since the Great
Depression").
WHATIS PASTIS PROLOGUE
regulatory decisions8 that Congress must reform if the U.S. is to
remain a global financial leader.9 It is asserted, however, that
these changes should not drastically alter the bedrock principles
upon which Glass-Steagall was based.
For the past twenty years, 10 members of Congress have pro-
posed various financial modernization models, none of which
have achieved the consensus needed to become law." Powerful
interest groups, including members of the banking, securities
and insurance industries, have effectively derailed every pro-
posal initiated.12 Nevertheless, during the 105th Congress, a new
8 See The 'Depository Institution Affiliation and Thrift Charter Conversion Act,"
1997: Hearings on H.R. 268 Before the SubCommittee on Financial Institutions and Con-
sumer Credit of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong.
(1997), available in 1997 WL 8219185, at *10 (statement of Marc E. Lackritz, President
of Securities Industry Association) (discussing pattern of piecemeal regulatory revision of
the Glass-Steagall Act resulting in unbalanced and confusing regulatory structure). See
generally David M. Eaton, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of Investment
Banks and Other Non-Banks, 44 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1225 n.3 (1995) (noting that agencies
and courts frequently interpret provisions of Glass-Steagall); A.J. Herbert, III, Comment,
Requiem on the Glass-Steagall Act: Tracing the Evolution and Current Status of Bank
Involvement in Brokerage Activities, 63 TUL. L. REV. 157, 157 (1988) (commenting on his-
torical account of Glass-Steagall Act's supplementation).
9 See Markup of H.R. 10, Financial Services Modernization Legislation Before House
Banking and Financial Services Committee, 105th Congress (1997), available in 1997 WL
4434040, at *6 ("If Congress does not restructure the financial services industry, the in-
dustry may restructure itself in a way that will reduce rather than strengthen the na-
tion's position as a leader in the Global financial services marketplace." (quoting David
Komansky, Chiarman, Merrill Lynch)); Christopher T. Toll, European Communities Sec-
ond Banking Directive: Can Antiquated U.S. Legislation Keep Pace?, 23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 615, 615 (1990) (noting that Europe's second banking directive sought to
avoid principles of Glass-Steagall governed banking system, which it viewed as prevent-
ing United States from more efficient action in global markets).
10 See Jim McTague, Empty Glass-Steagall? Banking-Reform Bill Unlikely This Year,
but Mergers Won't be Deterred, BARRON'S, Apr. 13, 1998, at 20 (stating that various legis-
lators have attempted to reform financial services industry since at least 1979).
11 See More, supra note 3, at 443 (stating that although Glass-Steagall has been
criticized as "depression era relic" Congress has considered, but not enacted number of
proposals that would repeal act); Regulatory Reform in Transition: the Dismantling of the
Glass-Steagall Act, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 545, 547 (1995) (indicating that serious efforts to
reform financial services industry were attempted in 1988 and 1991); see also William M.
Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future: Life Without Glass Steagall, 37 CATH. U. L.
REV. 281, 281 (1988) (discussing how numerous bills have been introduced to dismantle
Glass-Steagall including Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988).
12 See Bankers Trust Agrees to Buy Alex. Brown, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1997, at D1
(stating that various segments of financial services industry have bogged down Congres-
sional legislation for more than ten years, as they attempt to influence the debate among
lawmakers); see also Isaac & Fein, supra note 11, at 282 (noting that Glass-Steagall Re-
form has been held up in Congress due to opposition of industries facing competition
from banks, such as real estate and insurance as well as certain consumer groups); Jona-
than R. Macey, Fed Does End Run on Glass Steagall, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 28, 1997, at A21
(noting that a host of interest groups are resisting Glass-Steagall reform); Will Financial
Services Reform Pass This Fall?, FUND AcTION, Sept. 8, 1997, at 10 (noting that even if
Congressional session extends beyond October, competing interests of mutual funds, se-
curities firms, banks and insurance companies will most likely curtail ultimate restruc-
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reform bill, entitled the Financial Services Competitiveness Act,
("H.R. 10") garnered substantial support. 13 Although H.R. 10,
which effectively eliminates the separation of banking and com-
merce, has yet to pass both houses of Congress, the concepts it
engenders are critical to financial modernization.14
This Note asserts that the provisions in H.R. 10 weaken the
financial services industry by permitting the integration of com-
merce and banking. Part I of this Note discusses the history of
the Glass-Steagall Act and the evolution of the modern financial
industry. Part II describes how key provisions of H.R. 10 will
weaken the banking and finance industry. Part III provides
convincing reasons to oppose the enactment of a mixed banking
and commerce system such as H.R. 10. This Note concludes with
the proposition that, despite being viewed as antiquated, Glass-
Steagall is structurally safer for the United States' economy than
other plans to integrate banking and commerce.
A. History of the Glass-Steagall Act
In 1933, during the Great Depression, Congress passed the
Glass-Steagall Act to restore the American public's faith in the
banking industry.15 The utility of the Act in our modern finan-
turing of financial services).
13 See Jeffrey Taylor, House Committee Votes to Let Banks Affiliate with Non-
Financial Companies, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1997, at A4 (discussing how House Banking
Committee voted 35-19 to approve provision that would allow bank holding companies to
affiliate with non-financial companies); House Commerce Democrat Steps Into Reform
Debate, BANKING POL'Y REP., Sept. 1, 1997, at 3 (stating House Banking Committee ap-
proved Financial Services Competition Act of 1997 on June 20, and subsequently referred
to House Commerce Committee); House Panel Ok's Bill Allowing Banks, Brokerages to
Merge; 28-26 Vote Follows Heavy Lobbying by Financial Industries, BALT. SUN, June 21,
1997, at 9C (discussing how H.R. 10 passed House Banking Committee and then moved
to full House for vote).
14 See Brett D. Forsman, House Panel Backs Banking - Commerce Mix, WASH. POST,
June 18, 1997, at C13 (discussing House Banking Committee vote to allow banks to buy
commercial companies); William Gruber, Chains on Banks Still Strong Uphill Battle Still
Seen on Glass-Steagall, CHI. TRIB., July 8, 1997, at 1 (stating that if H.R. 10 were passed,
banks could own non-financial companies and vice versa); Jeffrey Taylor, Citicorp Mo-
tors? Panel to Take Up Bank Merger Law, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1997, at A24 (stating that
H.R. 10 would permit banking and commerce mix).
15 See Mary Margaret Cluck, Mortgage Backed Securities and Consumer Related Re-
ceivables: A Lesson From the Past With an Eye Toward the Future, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
227, 231 (1988) (stating that with Glass-Steagall, Congress sought to curtail national
banks' action in securities market so as to boost public confidence in industry); Emerick
Fisher, Banking and Insurance-Should Ever the Twain Meet?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 726, 737
(1992) (stating that Congressional intent behind passage of Glass-Steagall was reforma-
tion and recovery of banking system as well as restoring public confidence in it); Joan M.
Legraw & Stacy L. Davidson, Glass-Steagall and the "Subtle Hazards" of Judicial Activ-
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cial system, however, has encountered much debate.16
Congress enacted Glass-Steagal17 as a prophylactic measure
to ensure security in the financial industry.18 As such, Glass-
Steagall prevented commercial banks from partaking in securi-
ties activities.19 Prior to the Act's enactment, investors com-
monly used commercial bank loans for high-risk stock transac-
tions.20 The public, as well as legislators, believed that such
practices were a major cause of the Great Depression.21 Thus,
ism, 24 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 225, 226 (1989) (stating that motive behind Glass-Steagall
was to restore public confidence in industry by disallowing banks from dealing in securi-
ties).
16 See Jonathan Zubrow Cohen, The Mellon Bank Order: An Unjustifiable Expansion
of Banking Power, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 335, 340 (1994) (discussing how some critics
have called Glass-Steagall obsolete and called for its explicit repeal); Donna L. Lance,
Can the Glass-Steagall Act be Justified Under the Global Free Market Policies of the
Nafta?, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 297, 307 (1995) (questioning whether Glass-Steagall serves
goal of providing environment where banking industry can thrive); Joan K. Willen,
Commercial Banks and the Glass-Steagall Act: A Survey of New Products and Activities,
104 BANKING L.J. 5, 6 (1987) (stating that Act is obsolete in light of new economic reali-
ties).
17 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,377, 378, and 78 (1982). This note follows the common usage
that "Glass-Steagall Act" refers to four provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 that sepa-
rate commercial and investment banking.
18 See Joseph Michael Heppt, An Alternative to Throwing Stones: A Proposal for the
Reform of Glass-Steagall, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 281-82 (1986) (noting that Glass-
Steagall attempted to rectify banking industry indiscretions by prophylactic measures or
erecting wall between commercial and banking industries); D.A. Howard, Ownership of
Member Banks by Mutual Fund Advisors Under the Glass-Steagall Act, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 691, 691 (1984) (stating that Glass-Steagall sought to alleviate bank instability,
conflicts of interest and investor deception); Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups
Legislation and the Judicial Function: Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L. J. 1, 5
(1984) (discussing enactment of Glass-Steagall in order to stabilize activities of commer-
cial and investment banks).
19 See Rachel F. Robbins, Court Challenges in the Glass-Steagall Area: Practical Im-
plications, at 596 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6827, 1988)
(discussing Glass-Steagall's prohibition that commercial banks could not engage in secu-
rities activity); Jeffrey L. Elverman, Units of Participation in IRA Common Trust Funds
Offered by Commercial Banks: A Violation of the Glass Steagall Act?, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 745, 745 (1985) (stating that Glass Steagall Act mandated separation between
commercial and investment banks); Casey K. McGarvey, Federal Regulation of Bank Se-
curities Activities: Will Congress Allow Glass-Steagall to be Shattered?, 12 J. CONTEMP. L.
99, 99 (1986) (noting Glass-Steagall's prohibition of commercial banks' engagement in
securities activities).
20 See John K. Forst, Legislative Reform of Glass Steagall: Batik Sponsorship and
Distribution of Mutual Funds is Long Overdue, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 521, 526 (1990)
(discussing Congress' belief that pre-division activities of commercial and investment
banks gave rise to imprudent lending practices); Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E. Mattei, Or-
ganizational Freedom for Banks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895, 1895
(1997) (discussing idea that securities underwriting/dealing was unacceptable threat to
banks' safety and soundness); Kurtis J. Polk, Banking and Securities Law: The Glass-
Steagall Act-Has It Outlived Its Usefulness?, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 812 (1986)
(discussing Congress' belief that commercial bank failures during depression were
brought about by banks investing in and lending for speculative securities).
21 See Steven P. Kenkell, The D.C. Circuit Affirms Further Bank Expansion into Se-
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political climate of the 1930's precipitated the need for legisla-
tion aimed at restoring the overall faith in the strength of the
banking industry.22
The Glass-Steagall Act, contained within four sections of the
Banking Act of 1933,23 curtailed the security activities of com-
mercial banks.24 Section 1625 (i) prohibits a bank from buying
stocks for its own account (ii) imposes limits on its authority re-
garding debt instruments; and (iii) prohibits underwriting and
dealing in securities unless they are "bank eligible securities.26
Section 20, moreover, prevents member banks of the Federal Re-
serve from affiliating with any company "engaged principally" in
securities transactions.27 In addition, section 21 restricts in-
vestment banks from engaging in commercial banking.28 Finally,
section 32 prevents the directors, officers, employees or princi-
curities Businesses, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 736, 738 (1988) (attributing large part of bank
failures to speculative activities later remedied by drastically curtailing bank securities
activities); Scott D. Osborn, Discount Brokerage Services, The Glass-Steagall Act and
Branch Banking in Texas, 16 ST. MARY'S L. J. 185, 195 (1984) (discussing idea that in-
vestment dealings by banks were at least part of cause of depression era bank failures).
22 See Regulatory Reform, supra note 11, at 546 (stating that Congress enacted Act in
reaction to public outcry for corrective measures).
23 12 U.S.C.A. § 227.
24 See William J. Shafer, Glass-Steagall Reform: Its Time to Replace the Crumbling
Wall, 14 J. CORP. L. 973, 978 (1989) (explaining that these four sections are designed to
address specific problems arising from bank involvement in investment activities).
25 Banking Act of 1933, ch.89, § 16, 48 Stat. 184 (codified with some differences at 12
U.S.C. § 24 (1988)). Section 16 of the Banking Act states that:
[T]he business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be limited to
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the
order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the
association shall not underwrite any issues of security or stock....
Id.
26 See Shafer, supra note 24, at 978 (explaining three components of section 16 of
Banking Act of 1933).
27 See id. § 20, 48 Stat. 162, 188 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988)). This
section states that:
[N]o member bank shall be affiliated in any manner described in subsection (b) of
section 22 la of this title with any corporation, association, business trust, or other
similar organizations engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public
sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of
stocks....
Id.
28 See Banking Act of 1933, supra note 25, at ch. 89, § 21 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. 378 (1988)). Section 21 states that:
[I]t shall be unlawful (1) [Flor any person, firm, corporation, association, business
trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwrit-
ing, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or [retail, or through syndicate participa-
tion, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time
to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits....
Id.
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pals of commercial banks from simultaneously serving in those
capacities at a firm that are "primarily engaged in" investment
banking.29
In J.P. Morgan u. SEC,30 a bank holding company("BHC") suc-
cessfully challenged the "engaged principally" language in sec-
tion 20 of the Act.31 The Supreme Court held that a BHC could
establish a "securities arm" as long as the revenues from the se-
curities transactions did not exceed ten percent of the gross do-
mestic revenue. 32 Subsequently, in December 1996, the Federal
Reserve Board increased the amount that banks could earn from
security underwriting from ten to twenty-five percent. 33 This in-
crease cleared the way for a merger, the magnitude of which was
previously unseen, between a commercial bank, Bankers Trust
New York Corp. and Alex Brown, the oldest brokerage firm in
the country. 34
29 See id. at § 32, 194 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)). This section
states that:
[N]o officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association,
no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in
the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail,
or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall
serve the same time as officer, director, or employee of any member bank....
Id.
30 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1987).
31 See id. at 194 (allowing bank affiliates to underwrite and deal in bank ineligible
securities as long as such activity is limited to five to ten percent of affiliates' gross reve-
nues).
32 See Shafer, supra note 24, at 973 (stating that Board's determination allowed bank
affiliates to underwrite and deal in bank ineligible securities provided that activity was
between five and ten percent of affiliate's gross revenue); see also Stephen Phillips, Fed-
eral Reserve Eases Restrictions on Bank Activities, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 21, 1996, at Cl
(stating that attorneys for J.P. Morgan & Co. successfully argued that Morgan could deal
in securities to limited extent); Regulatory Reform, supra note 11, at 560 (discussing J.P.
Morgan's engagement in securities attributed to relaxation of Glass-Steagall provisions).
33 See Rob Wells, Fed Expands Bank Underwriting Powers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec.
20, 1996, at D4 (stating that Fed increased amount banks can earn from securities from
ten to twenty-five percent of bank's overall revenue); see also Dean Foust & Allison Rea,
Crashing Through Glass-Steagall, BUS. WK., Nov. 4, 1996, at 184 (predicting that Fed
was on verge of increasing amount of banks gross revenues derived from securities
transactions from ten to twenty-five percent); Edward Hurlihy et. al., Financial Institu-
tions Mergers and Acquisitions 1996 Another Successful Round of Consolidation and
Capital Management, in FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, at 251,
320 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7179, 1997) (discussing
easing of regulatory restrictions on Bank holding companies which allow percentage of
revenue from ineligible activities to rise to twenty-five percent).
34 See Bankers Trust Agrees to Buy Alex. Brown Securities, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997,
at DI (explaining that Banker's Trust New York Corp. agreed to purchase brokerage
Alex. Brown for $1.64 billion in stock, resulting in one of the biggest acquisitions of secu-
rities firm by commercial bank); Jon Birger, Brokers Lead in Turf Battle: Gain Edge Over
Commercial Banks in Swiping Each Other's Business, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Apr. 21, 1997,
at 3 (mentioning effect of merger between Alex. Brown & Co. and Bankers Trust); Edwin
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Regulatory and judicial decisions created the twenty-five per-
cent window facilitating the interaction of commercial banks and
investment banks.35 Many commentators believe, however, that
Congress has the ultimate responsibility to create an effective
blueprint for financial services reform.36
B. The Evolution of Modern Financial Practices
The Banking Industry is comprised of banks and bank holding
companies.37 Although they are governed by different regulatory
agencies, 38 the provisions of the Act affect both of these entities.39
Blount, Banking in the Third Millenium, ABA BANKING J., June 1997, at 34 (contending
that acquisition of Alex. Brown & Co. would have enormous impact on banking industry);
Michelle DeBlasi, Pumping Up, BANK INVESTMENT MARKETING, Sept. 1997, at 42 (stating
that Bankers Trust Alex. Brown merger was first acquisition of brokerage firm by United
States commercial bank possibly marking death of Glass-Steagall); Jill Dutt, Climbing
Over a Banking Barrier; Bankers Trust Bids $1.7 Billion for Alex. Brown; Deal May Spur
Changes in Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1997, at Cl (contending that merger between
Bankers Trust and Alex. Brown Inc. exemplifies disintegration of Glass-Steagall Act).
35 See Banker's Trust Takes Advantage of New Section 20 Limit, 16 NO. 8 BANKING
POL'Y REP. 12, 12 (1997) (discussing Federal Reserve Board's increase of amount of gross
revenue section 20 subsidiary can derive from securities underwriting from ten to
twenty-five percent); Fed Votes to Replace Section 20 Firewalls with New Standards, 16
NO. 17 BANKING POL'Y REP. 5, 5 (1997) (discussing raise from ten to twenty percent that
banks can deal in "bank ineligible" securities without violating Glass-Steagall restric-
tions); Edward D. Herlihy & Craig M. Wasserman et. al., Banks are Acquiring Invest-
ment Banking Firms at Rapid Pace, 16 NO. 14 BANKING POL'Y REP. 1, 12 (1997)
(explaining that Federal Reserve Board's widening of section 20 window will allow many
banks to buy some large broker/dealer franchise).
36 See Bankers Trust Deal Shows Need For Immediate Action On Financial Moderni-
zation, Government Press Release, Apr. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4431654, at *3
(statement of Marge Roukema, Chairperson of House Financial Institutions Subcommit-
tee) (stating that it is duty of Congress to take action in regard to financial moderniza-
tion and not let that duty pass to regulators and Comptroller of Currency); John J. King,
Comment, The Dangers of Piecemeal Reformation of the United States Banking Industry,
39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1099, 1127 (1995) (arguing that Congress should abandon piecemeal
approach to financial services reform and focus on comprehensive structural reform).
37 See PHILIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS
177 (1992) (stating that industry consists of banks and bank holding companies and both
entities are subject to separate regulatory schemes administered by distinct federal
agencies); Rodgin Cohen & Michael Wiseman, Improving Banking's Competitive Position:
A Modest Proposal, 12 NO. 19 BANKING POL'Y REP. 1, 19 (1993) (explaining dynamics of
financial industry); Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and Branching Under the
Riegle Neal Act of 1994, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 183-84 (1986) (discussing function of
banks and banking holding companies in financial services industry).
38 See Halpert, supra note 3, at 485 (explaining that banks are subject to elaborate
system of regulations that involves numerous overlapping federal, as well as state
authorities); see also Melanie L. Fein, Fed's Proposed Overhaul of Regulation Y Goes Far,
but Could be Bolder, 15 NO. 20 BANKING POLY REP. 4, 4 (1996) (discussing bank holding
company regulations undertaken at regulatory level); Stephen J. Friedman & Connie M.
Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation Getting from Here to There, 43 MD. L.
REV. 413, 415 (1984) (asserting that federal agencies and individual state agencies regu-
late banking industry and discussing rapid changes in financial services market that
have rendered current regulatory system obsolete).
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For two decades after the passage of the Act, banks adhered to
its proscriptions and abstained from engaging in securities
transactions.40 By the 1950's, however, the rejuvenated securi-
ties industry re-emerged as a competitive threat to the banking
industry.41 As a result of competition with the securities indus-
try, banks began to lose corporate consumers to investment
banks that offered loans and other services to customers at lower
prices, as well as more competitive interest rates.42 In response,
many banks began utilizing a loophole in the Act that allowed
companies to form a "corporate shell" known as a bank holding
company.43 To establish a bank holding company, the parent
39 See BLUMBERG & STRASSER, supra note 37, at 177-178 (stating that policy behind
Glass-Steagall Act was to separate investment banking and commercial banking and it is
this policy that informs and influences determinations of acceptable activities under
Bank Holding Company Act); see also Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, The On-
going Process of International Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Convergence: A New
Regulatory Market "Partnership," 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 227, 279 (1997) (stating that
bank holding companies and banks are subject to Glass-Steagall Act); Client Memos,
INSIGHTS, July 1993, at 7 (asserting that Glass-Steagall Act inhibits activities of both
banks and bank holding companies in context of mutual fund activities).
40 See Regulatory Reform, supra note 11, at 550 (explaining that banks began to re-
engage in securities activities as result of competition between commercial banks and
investment banks); George G. Kaufman & Larry R. Mote, Glass-Steagall: Repeal by
Regulatory and Judicial Re-interpretation, 107 BANKING L.J. 388, 396 (1990) (discussing
proposition that state of banking industry following Great Depression deterred wide-
spread efforts by banks to re-enter securities business until 20 years later).
41 See Regulatory Reform, supra note 11, at 550 (stating that during 1950's banks
began to seek ways to avoid Glass Steagall Act in order to remain competitive in indus-
try); see also Kaufman & Mote, supra note 40, at 395 (asserting that when securities
market became profitable again in 1950's banks sought to weaken Glass-Steagall re-
strictions and conduct securities activities); Stewart J. Vogelsmeier, Note, Evaluating
Bank Commercial Paper Placement Activity Under the Glass Steagall Act, 65 WASH. U. L.
Q. 615, 615 (1987) (stating that banks began to offer services that had traditionally been
offered by investment banking sector in response to growth in financial services mar-
kets).
42 See Isaac & Fein, supra note 11, at 294 (explaining how securities firms compete
with banks for deposits by providing functional equivalents that are market sensitive);
Peter J. Ferrara, The Regulatory Separation of Banking From Securities and Commerce
in the Modern Financial Market Place, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 583, 622 (1991) (stating that cer-
tain investment banks can provide broader spectrum of products at lower prices than
commercial banks); Charles G. Roberts, He Who Hesitates is Lost, Congressional Inaction
and Commercial Banking, 5 HOFSTRA L. J. 219, 241 (1992) (discussing how banks lost
deposits when investors switched to capital markets because they offered better rates
than banks); see also McTague, supra note 10, at 20 (stating that prospect of cross-selling
each other's products is driving force behind mega-merger between Travelers and
Citigroup).
43 See Regulatory Reform, supra note 11, at 550 (explaining that banks would form
bank holding company to own both bank and non-bank and utilize non-bank in order to
circumvent Glass-Steagall provisions); Cohen, supra note 16, at 344-345 (discussing that
Glass-Steagall Act provoked banks to form bank holding companies as corporate shells to
own both banking and non-banking businesses); Carol S. Shahmoon, Note, Federal Re-
serve Board Authority Over Bank Subsidiaries Under the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 965, 976 (1991) (explaining Congress' legislative intent in
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company would create a separate subsidiary through which it
could conduct securities business.44 This bank holding company
structure allowed the parent companies to circumvent the regu-
lations that governed banks.45
To prevent financial service companies from amassing too
much power, Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company
Act("BHCA").46 This Act limits bank holding companies to ac-
tivities "closely related to banking."47  Despite the fact that
BHCA regulations permitted bank holding companies to engage
in a limited amount of securities activities, including securities
brokering and investment advice, bank holding companies peti-
tioned the Federal Reserve Board to expand these activities.48
passing Bank Holding Company Act was to close loop hole that allowed banks to engage
in securities activities vis-a-vis non-bank subsidiaries).
44 See James J. Croke, Jr., New Developments in Asset Backed Commercial Paper, in
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 1997, at 139 (PLI Comm. and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A4-4528, 1997) (noting that in 1987, Federal Reserve Board
authorized bank holding companies to create subsidiaries which could engage in under-
writing securities); Joyce M. Hansen & Elizabeth Davy et. al., Swaps & Other Derivatives
in 1997 Bank Regulatory Developments, in SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES IN 1997, at 481, 497-
98 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7212, 1997) (explaining
that securities activities may be conducted by subsidiary of bank holding company); The
Monitor, 16 No. 20 BANKING POL'Y REP. 15, 15 (1997) (stating that in 1997 Federal Re-
serve Board amended limitations established in Bank Holding Company Act and Glass-
Steagall Act to allow bank holding company subsidiaries to engage in securities transac-
tions).
45 See id.
46 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1998) (prohibiting bank holding company from participating
in commercial business, as well as other non-financial activities); Aloni Golanski, Note,
Bank Merging and the Implicate Order: Northeast Bank Corp. v. Board of Governors 17
CONN. L. REV. 861, 866 (1985) (stating that original intent of Bank holding company Act
was to define bank holding companies, require divestment of non-banking interests and
control their future expansion); Mary Jo Wetmore, Note, Banking and Commerce: Are
They Different? Should They be Separated?, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994, 997 (1989)
(arguing that Act was intended to deal with two problems: Concentration of commercial
bank facilities and combination of banking and non-banking businesses under single con-
trol); Michael Schroeder, It's Alive: Why Glass-Steagall, Reviled for Decades, Just Won't
Go Away; Law that Separates Banks, Brokers Always Manages to Find a Patron in Time;
Citicorp was a Fan, Before, WALL ST. J, Apr. 10, 1998, at Al (stating that Congress did
not intervene until fear that BHC's were becoming too powerful).
47 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (providing prohibitions on roles of Bank holding companies);
see also Regulatory Reform, supra note 11, at 550 (stating that before board approval is
granted under BHCA, board administers two-pronged test which is designed to reveal
whether proposed activity is "closely related to banking"); Halpert, supra note 3, at 489
(stating that affiliates of bank holding companies may only engage in businesses that are
"closely related" to banking and offer preponderance of "public benefits").
48 See J.P. Morgan & Co., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192, 193 (1989) (indicating that five na-
tional bank holding companies have successfully petitioned Federal Reserve Board to be
able to deal in various forms of debt and equity securities); Shafer, supra note 24, at 986
(1989) (stating that five bank holding companies including J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., Chase
Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New York, Citicorp, Security Pacific Corp. petitioned
Federal Reserve Board requesting that their subsidiaries be allowed to underwrite in
addition to dealing in debt as well as equity securities).
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Consequently, the Federal Reserve Board allowed a significant
amount of leeway in this area, resulting in vast litigation.49
Historically, the federal judiciary and the Federal Reserve
Board have been extremely supportive of BHC's in their quest to
expand their services to include greater amounts of securities
activities.50 Indeed, it is the BHC structure that enabled the un-
precedented merger between Travelers Insurance and
Citigroup.5' The long-term viability of this combination, how-
ever, remains undetermined because the Act precludes the unre-
stricted combinations of commercial banking, insurance compa-
nies and investment banks that the merger promises.52
II. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPETITIVENESS ACT (H.R. 10)
The Financial Service Competitiveness Act of 1997,53 proposed
sweeping changes that would eradicate the Act's barriers pre-
venting the integration of commerce and banking.54 This new
49 See Regulatory Reform, supra note 11, at 552 (explaining that Glass-Steagall re-
lated litigation stems from tension created by differences in statutory language and ad-
ministrative and judicial interpretation of broad Glass-Steagall provisions). See generally
Donald C. Langewood, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Reverse Role
of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH L. REV. 672, 705 (1987) (noting
that Glass-Steagall litigation has presented opportunity for Section 20 to be construed in
way to weaken Glass-Steagall). See, e.g., Securities Industry Assoc. v. Board of Gover-
nors, 468 U.S. 207, 207 (1984) (holding that holding companies were free to enter broker-
age activities because strict reading of section 20 pertained to companies principally en-
gaged in traditional distribution of securities).
50 See Bankers Trust New York Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 829, 830 (1989) (noting that
private placement of commercial paper by BHC nonbank subsidiary is not underwriting
or deal for purposes of Glass-Steagall); Regulatory Reform, supra note 11, at 548(explaining that regulatory agencies as well as federal courts have allowed significant
expansion of bank securities power); Feds Must Understand Risk, Risk Management,
CAP. MKT. REP. , Feb. 26, 1998, available in Westlaw at 2/26/98, Cap. Mkt. Rep. 19:32:00(noting that Fed has been drawn into regulatory issues that arise out of bank expansion
into securities transactions).
51 See Ron Chernow, The Birth of a Bureaucratic Mastedon?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,
1998, at A22 (explaining that Citicorp will be absorbed into Travelers, which will then
apply to Federal Reserve Board for BHC status); McTague, supra note 10, at 20 (stating
that merger is structured so Travelers acquires Citicorp and Travelers applies to Fed for
bank charter and at such time, Fed has discretion to give new company up to five years
to divest itself of impermissible nonbanking activities, such as securities underwriting).
52 See McTague, supra note 10, at 20 (stating that Travelers Group and Citicorp are
gambling that Congress will finally rewrite Glass-Steagall Act, paving way for their
merger en toto).
53 See H.R. 10, 104th Cong.(1997) (re-introduced in 1998 and 1999 sessions in sub-
stantially similar form); Steven Cocheo, One More Time: With (BIF-SAIF) Behind Him
House Banking Chief Jim Leach Has High Hopes for Bank Modernization, ABA BANKING
J. , Mar. 1, 1997, at 34 (explaining that securities affiliates would be permitted to engage
in merchant banking).
54 See H.R. REP. No. 105-164 II, at 4 (1997) (quoting sponsor James A. Leach that:
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proposal allows commercial banks, securities firms and insur-
ance companies to combine their services in a way that resem-
bles European and Japanese systems, known as "universal
banking."55 This bill is Congress' attempt to reclaim the respon-
sibility of deciding the status of the financial services industry
from the courts and regulators.56
A. Fundamental Concepts of H.R. 10
The major provisions of H.R. 10 allow non-banking firms such
as securities and insurance outfits to merge with commercial
banks.57 The bill would have allowed non-financial commercial
firms to own small banks through a well-capitalized holding
company and permit bank holding companies to own commercial
firms,58 subject to certain revenue limitations.59 It also permits
"The bill would allow two approaches that would mix banking and commerce."); Where's
Wall Street? And Does It Matter?, WALL ST. & TECH, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL
13096712, *8-10 (noting that bill will allow banks to offer same services as securities
firms and vice versa).
55 See Reinhold Leichtfuss & Fran Mettern, Best Practices: What Retail Banks Can
Learn From Each Other, J. OF RETAIL BANKING SERV., Dec. 1, 1996, at 41 (describing how
United States, Japanese, European banking systems are all evolving toward similarity);
Dean Foust, Opening the Door to Another Banking Crisis, Bus. WK., June 23, 1997, at
156 (refuting argument of commentators who favor melding banking and commerce by
stating that main reason for Japanese banks huge losses are loans to affiliated non-
financial companies). See, e.g., Dyan Machan & Peter Fuhrman et. al., Finance Shokku
(Japanese Banking Industry), FORBES, Apr. 13, 1992, at 42 (describing Japanese inter-
locking shareholder system where among other things, manufacturing companies invest
in bank stocks in return for cheap loans).
56 See Bankers Trust Deal, supra note 36, at *2 (discussing need for Congress to take
lead in banking regulation); Financial Services Restructuring: Views of Fleet Financial
Group on H.R. 10, the 'Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997" Before the House
Subcomm. On Finance & Hazardous Materials of the Committee on Commerce, 104th
Cong., July 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 446990, at *3 (statement of John P. Hamill,
President, Fleet Bank) (explaining that Congress should pass H.R. 10 in order to promote
rational and reasonable regulatory oversight).
57 See Kenneth Guenther, IBAA Executive Vice President, Kenneth A. Guenther
Sends Letter to Chairman of House Commerce Committee Regarding the Financial Serv-
ices Competition Act, PR NEWSWIRE, July 31, 1997, available in Westlaw, 7/31/97, PRN
Newswire 13:01:00, at *3 (stating that H.R. 10 destroys barriers between banking and
commerce by stretching Federal Deposit Insurance safety net to unintended areas by
permitting commercial banks to integrate with securities firms, and also allowing com-
mercial firms to integrate with banks); IBAA: Controversial Banking Legislation Likely to
Bring Higher Bank Fees, PR NEWSWIRE, July 31, 1997, available in Westlaw, 7/31/97 PR
Newswire, 14:20:00, at *1 (fearing higher bank fees, small businesses believe H.R. 10 will
further concentrate financial industry); Katherine M. Reynolds, House Panel Wraps
Hearing on Financial Modernization Bill, BOND BUYER, July 31, 1997, at 5 (discussing
H.R. 10 and its allowance of banking, securities, and insurance institutions to own each
other).
58 See H.R. REP. No. 105-164, at 4 (1997). The "[blank holding companies could own
commercial firms as long as the aggregate commercial revenues do not exceed fifteen
percent of the holding companies' gross domestic revenues." Id. "It would also allow a
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certain activities, whereby well-capitalized, well-managed, bank
holding companies could own a "basket" of commercial firms.60
The aggregate commercial revenues of such an institution, how-
ever, could not exceed fifteen percent of the holding company's
gross domestic revenues. 61 Additionally, the "reverse basket"
approach also allows a non-financial firm to control a bank
holding company with one "small" commercial bank, whose as-
sets could not total more than $500 milion.62 Furthermore, that
"small" bank's revenues could not exceed 15 percent of the con-
commercial firm to control a bank holding company with one small bank (less than $500
million in assets)." Id.; see also Bill McConnell, Leach: Keeps Banks and Non-Financial
Firms Separate Series: 10 AM. BANKER, Feb. 20, 1997, at 3. In a speech, Representative
Leach stated that his legislation "would let investment bank holding companies put a
small amount of non-financial assets in wholesale, uninsured financial institutions..."
Id.; Katherine M. Reynolds, House Commerce Committee Continues Modernization Talks
Behind the Scenes, BOND BUYER, Sept. 11, 1997, at 5. H.R. 10 will allow "...[b]anks, se-
curities firms, and insurance companies to own one another and, to a limited degree,
commercial companies could enter into the mix." Id.
59 See Roukema Says Commerce Should Not Reserve Charter Conversion Debate, 16
No. 15 BANKING POL'Y REP. 5, Aug. 4, 1997, at *5 (stating that bill would allow holding
companies to invest up to fifteen percent of gross revenue in commercial activities); OCC
is Critical of House Banking Committee Bill, 16 NO. 4 BANKING PoLY REP. 2, July 21,
1997, at 6 (explaining that if bank holding company is allowed to derive fifteen percent of
its gross revenues from affiliations with non-financial, bank holding company will be
subject to Federal Reserve Board oversight, but if non-financial company owns bank un-
der reverse basket approach, parent company will not be subject to same federal stan-
dards).
60 See H.R. REP. No. 105-164; Cocheo, supra note 53, at 34 (explaining that under
holding company structure, banks could affiliate with securities firms and insurance
companies, provided revenue limitations are adhered to).
61 See Financial Services Restructuring, Address Before House Banking and Finan-
cial Services Committee, June 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11233222, at *3 (statement
of Jonathan D. Hawke, Treasury Undersecretary for Domestic Finance) (elaborating on
financial requirements necessary to acquire bank holding company status); Guenther,
supra note 57 (explaining that banks' ownership of commercial affiliate comprising fif-
teen percent of its gross domestic income is referred to as "basket"; and that corpora-
tion's ownership of small bank is referred to as "reverse basket"); Bank Deregulation; Re-
peal of Glass- Steagall (H.R. 10), BOND BUYER, June 24, 1997, at 5 (indicating that under
H.R. 10, banks, securities firms, and insurance companies could merge with commercial
companies as long as they do not exceed fifteen percent "basket" of financial companies
gross revenues).
62 See Financial Modernization, Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on Fi-
nance and Hazardous Materials Committee on Commerce, July 17, 1997, available in
1997 WL 11235799, at *18 (testimony of Andrew C. Hove, Acting Chairman, FDIC). H.R.
10 also would allow a commercial firm to control a [qualified] bank holding company with
one small bank, a bank with $500 million or less in assets, without the commercial firm
becoming a bank holding company. Id.; Comments on Recent OCC Circulars About H.R.
10, Before House Banking and Financial Services Committee, July 24, 1997, available in
1997 WL 12101496, at *15 (testimony of Rep. James A. Leach). The reverse basket ap-
proach allows a commercial entity to own a bank with assets of over $500 million. Id.
Katherine M. Reynolds, Committee Wades Through Financial Modernization Bill, BOND
BUYER, June 19, 1997, at 5. House Banking Committee voted 25-23 to pass a reverse
basket amendment which allows non-financial companies to obtain fifteen percent of
their gross revenues from a bank with less than $500 million in assets. Id.
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solidated gross domestic revenues of the commercial firm.63
B. Preventative Measures
Moreover, H.R. 10 includes so-called "firewalls."64 These pro-
visions purportedly protect the Federal Deposit Insurance Com-
pany ("FDIC") from having to undertake bailouts by prohibiting
banks from lending depositors' insured funds to their commercial
affiliate.65 The effectiveness of these "firewalls" has been subject
to much scrutiny.66 It is the market, not regulations, that dictate
the financial transactions between banks and their affriates.67
In addition, contagion risk is an often-cited failure of firewalis.
Implicit in contagion risk theory is the notion that if a bank's
non-financial venture needs an infusion of capital, the bank will
find a way to lend needed funds to their subsidiary regardless of
63 H.R. REP. No. 164 (II), 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 584295, at *44
(noting revenue limitations of small banks under reverse basket approach of H.R. 10).
64 See id. at *8 (discussing firewall provision of H.R. 10 intended to protect bank
components of financial services organization from other riskier activities); Steven D.
Kaye et. al, Megamerger One Stop Shopping is a Mixed Bag for Banking Consumers, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 20, 1998, at 62 (questioning whether it is safe for corps to
have access to depositors funds during serious economic downturn, since instinctive re-
action of corporation is survival and as such, it will use profitable units to subsidize other
units in crisis).
65 See H. R. REP. No. 105-164, at 6 (1997). "The bill would create 'firewalls' to protect
the banking components of a financial services organization from its riskier securities,
insurance, or other financial affiliates, hopefully preventing financial and informational
abuses and conflicts of interest." Id.; Financial Services Restructuring, Before the Com-
mittee on Banking and Financial Services, 104 th Cong., May 22, 1997, available in 1997
WL 10571950, at *34 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC). "The commission
generally supports the firewalls in H.R. 10 and H.R. 268 that would require a securities
affiliate of a bank to make certain disclosures to its customers." Id. "For example, the
bills would require disclosure that the securities being sold are not FDIC-insured, not
bank deposits and not bank guaranteed." Id.; John R. Walter, Firewalls, ECONOMIC Q.,
Sept. 1, 1996, at 15. "Firewalls, limit, prohibit or set standards for transactions between
banks and affiliated non-banking companies." Id.
66 See Building a Firewall: Can It Work?, AM. BANKER, Dec. 14, 1987, at 1 (stating
that even proponents of Glass-Steagall reform admit that firewalls do not provide secu-
rity, especially in troubled times); Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks and
Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REV. 314, 380
(1990) (stating that management has variety of ways to evade firewall restrictions,
thereby eliminating their effectiveness); Roberts, supra note 42, at 285 (stating that fire-
walls do not generally work in times of crises because capital can easily be moved when
needed).
67 See William M. Aukamp, Mixing Banking and Commerce: Beware!, U.S. BANKER,
June 1,1997, at 73. "Firewalls and other legal safeguards aside, when under pressure
from superiors in an organization some individuals will not risk their careers by refusing
to act as directed." Id.; Rep. Markey Rejects Bank Commerce Plan, But Still Open on Af-
filiations Provisions, BNA BANKING DAILY, Aug. 1, 1991, at 2. "No matter what the writ-
ten rule and stated intentions, I believe that commercial pressure will burst through
firewalls despite our best intentions, if we put major corporations in charge of banks". Id.
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any prohibitions against such an arrangement.6 8
C. Wholesale Financial Institutions
H.R. 10 also proposed to create a new type of bank: Wholesale
Financial Institution ("Woofies").69 Woofies are banks that are
regulated by BHC restrictions and are not able to accept insured
deposits or deposits less than $100,000.70 Holding companies
with a Woofie and no federally insured depository institution
would have greater flexibility to engage in non-financial invest-
ments. 7' Woofies do not interact with insured deposits and, as a
result, would not require any federal bailout should speculative
business practices impair investments. 72 As such, it is asserted
that Woofies do not pose the same problems as the basket ap-
proaches.
III. DESTROYING THE BARRIER BETWEEN BANKING AND
COMMERCE WILL CREATE ANOTHER BANKING CRISIS
Significant problems will arise where a bank utilizes the bas-
ket approach to purchase a non-financial interest or a corpora-
tion employs the reverse basket approach to purchase a small
bank.73 The authors submit that past experiences in industries
68 See Paul Tannenbaum, Banking Reform Proposals, 63 U.COLO. L. REV. 811, 827
(1992) (stating that due to market pressures, it is highly improbable that bank would not
come to rescue of failing subsidiary of its holding company.); Through a Glass Darkly
(Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Separating Commercial Banks and Investment Banks was
Unnecessary Then and Now), ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 1994, at 92 (stating that some initial
pro-Glass-Steagall arguments centered on the concern that if bank was owed money by
failing company, it would sell securities to unsuspecting public in effort to clear debt).
69 See H.R. REP. No. 105-164, at 2 (defining parameters of Wholesale Financial Insti-
tution).
70 See id. at 21 (stating that such non-banks would be required to comply with bank
holding company restrictions pursuant to Bank Bolding Company Act as well as Com-
munity Reinvestment Act).
71 See id. at 22 (stating that holding company which only has woofies, with no fed-
erally insured deposits, will be afforded greater flexibility in form of larger basket for
commercial investment).
72 See Statement on Changes in Banking Bill Before the Financial Services Council,
Government Press Release, Dec. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11126511, at *12
(statement of Rep. James A. Leach, Chairman, House Committee of Banking and Finan-
cial Services) (stating that restrictions placed on Woofies will create entity that does not
pose threat to Federal Deposit Insurance Company). See generally H.R. REP. No. 105-164
II, 21-22.
73 See Henry B. Gonzalez, Views of Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (D-San-
Antonio, Tex.) (visited October 27, 1997 ) <http://www.house.govfbanking/addvgonz.htm>
(describing reverse basket provision as "very risky and dangerous step to take"); Miles
Moore, NTDRA Among Many Groups Opposing Banking Reform Bill, TIRE BUS., Oct. 13,
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and countries permitting such interaction between banking and
commerce have demonstrated the potential disaster surrounding
such financial practices.74
A. Forseeable Risks
In Investment Company Inst. v. Camp,75 the Supreme Court
foresaw two major risks in mixing banking and commerce. 76
First, the Court stated that banks might invest their assets in
imprudent stocks or securities.77 Second, it foretold the likeli-
hood that banks would make unsound loans to subsidiaries to
avoid losing public confidence in those affihiates.78
Critics of the Camp court, on the other hand, have assailed
this logic by contending that a rational bank would neither en-
gage in the economically unsound behavior of selling overpriced
securities or make unsound loans to subsidiaries.79 Further-
1997, at 18 (quoting from letter that coalition of business groups sent to Rep. Thomas
Bliley, Chairman of the House Commerce Committee, opposing H.R. 10.) (stating that
"[plermitting commercial banks to merge with commercial firms would be bad public
policy and steer our nation down a perilous economic course"); see also Guenther, supra
note 57, at *1 (declaring that mixing of commerce and banking will lead to dangerous
concentration of economic assets, while also jeopardizing impartial allocation of credit,
reducing competition, shrinking number of institutions in consumer market place).
74 See Kaye & Egan, supra note 4, at 60-62 (reiterating that combination of banking
and non-banking firms places nation's financial system in danger and emphasizing that
marriage of brokers and banking created S&L crisis).
75 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
76 See Investment Company Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971) (illustrating
foreseeable risks associated with mixing banking and commerce); Jonathan R. Macey,
Special Interest Group Legislation and The Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-
Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 6 (1984) (arguing that banks may make inherently risky in-
vestments without prevention mechanisms).
77 See Camp, 401 U.S. at 628.
78 See id. at 630-36. The Court was mainly concerned that hazards arising from
banks' public identification with their securities affiliates and the corresponding effect of
the public's perception of banks' viability would precipitate conflicts of interest. Id. at
630. In addition, the Court cautioned against the possibility that banks would extend
credit imprudently. Id. at 631. Further the Court warned that depositors may not recog-
nize the risks involved with investing in the banks' security affiliates by mistakenly as-
suming that they are as secure as bank deposits. Id. at 630; see also Brown, supra note 7,
at 133-134. Banks are susceptible to making uninformed decisions when the well-being
and credibility of their subsidiary is at stake. Id.
79 See Brown, supra note 6, at 134 (arguing that banks will not sell speculative secu-
rities or make improper loans to affiliates). See generally Peter J. Ferrara, The Regula-
tory Separation of Banking From Securities and Commerce in the Modern Financial
Marketplace, 33 ARiz. L. REV. 583, 593 (1991) (asserting that maintaining separation be-
tween banking and securities activities is both difficult and impractical); Daniel R.
Fischel & Andrew M. Rosenfield et. al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding
Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 326 (1987) (stating that banks would have no incentive to
subsidize "troubled" affiliate).
1998] WHAT IS PASTIS PROLOGUE
more, critics claim that good management skills and sound busi-
ness practice would ensure the prosperity of banks.80
However, the following examples demonstrate that the Camp
Court's concerns; indeed, banking and corporate executives can-
not always be relied upon to be prudent decision makers. In the
three decades since Camp, the United States government and its
European and Asian counterparts have been forced to bail-out
failed lending institutions because customers' deposits were used
to engage in failed speculative transactions.81 In general, the
lenders had virtually no experience with the individual ventures,
and no way to assess the reliability of loan repayment or return
on their investments.82 These unsound practices have given rise
to several financial crises from which important lessons must be
learned.
B. Financial Problems Abroad. The Jusen Crisis and Credit
Lyonnais
The Jusen Crisis, which nearly toppled the prestigious Japa-
nese Ministry of Finance,83 epitomized the inherent danger of
80 See Brown, supra note 6, at 134 (stating that commentators who espouse risk-
based conventional argument fail to realize that foreign banks have been able to mini-
mize risks associated with corporate underwriting by prudently limiting risks).
81 See Steven Butler, Better Late than Never, Japan Finally Moves to Clean Up Its
Banking Mess, But There's a Lot More to be Done, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 26,
1998, at 53 (detailing how Japanese lawmakers voted to allocate $508 billion of taxpayer
money to support sagging banks); Gail E. Edmondson, This Time, the Bailout May Work,
A State Rescue Will Force Credit Lyonnais to Sell Off Its Assets, Bus. WK., May 25, 1998,
at 50 (noting that French government has rescued Lyonnais three times in past five
years because of mismanagement and incompetence); William Pesek, Jr., Citigroup: Too
Big to Fail? Fed Staffers Signal Reviving Fear of an Overheating Economy, BARRON'S,
Apr. 13, 1998 (noting how federal regulators were forced to bail out Continental Illinois
by funneling $4.5 billion into bank to avoid worst failure since Great Depression); Neil
Weinberg, In the Name of the Common Good, the Japanese People Have Come to Accept a
System that is Inimical to Their Best Interests, FORBES, Nov. 16, 1998, at 22 (noting how
Japanese Ministry of Finance has vowed to save all large banks, rather than liquidate
them, in same fashion as U.S. government did during the S & L crisis).
82 See Justin Fox, Why Japan Won't Budge: Everyone Wants Japan to Save Asia by
Gunning Its Economy, FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 1998, at 82 (blaming Japanese bank crisis on
haphazard granting of excess credit in speculative ventures); Conspiracy Theories,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 84 (discussing how S & L owners lent money for risky in-
vestments that proved to be long term losers).
83 See Edward W. Desmond, How the Mighty Have Fallen; Once the Engine of Ja-
pan's Economy, the Elite Finance Ministry is Facing Unprecedented Attacks on Its Com-
petence and Power, TIME INT'L, Feb. 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8824767, at *12
(describing how series of embarrassing scandals surrounding jusen crisis has caused
seemingly infallible Ministry of Finance to fall from grace); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geof-
frey P. Miller, Japanese Financial Regulation as Seen From the "Jusen Problem" 26
(1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors) (stating that Ministry of Finance
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mixing banking and commerce. 84 As a result of the crisis, lead-
ing Japanese banks have suffered tremendous financial losses on
their non-financial ventures.8 5
The crisis was sparked when seven jusen, or housing-loan
companies, funded by Japan's largest banks and agricultural co-
operatives, went bankrupt.86 The jusen had extended credit to
real estate companies with poor performance records, who in
turn engaged in speculative transactions.87 Moreover, the lend-
ing practices of the jusen management, characterized as
"blatantly sloppy" and "irresponsible,"88 resulted in billions of
dollars in bad loans89 that the Ministry of Finance was eventu-
lost much credibility because of erroneous estimation of non-performing loans by Japa-
nese financial institutions as well as perception that it would jeopardize strong financial
institutions by acquisition of failing institutions).
84 See Milhaupt & Miller, supra note 83, at 19-21 (stating that financial liberaliza-
tion, lack of regulatory oversight, speculative lending and bubble economy combined to
create jusen crisis); Desmond, supra note 83, at *4 (stating that government report certi-
fied inadequate lending practices by jusen administrators); Douglas Ostrom, Tax Payer
Tab Rises for Jusen Bailout, JEI REP., Feb. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8315842, at *2
(stating that Cabinet at Ministry of Finance signed off on plan to cope with secondary
losses absorbed by new jusen rescue organization when it acquires $68 billion in bad loan
debt from jusens).
85 See Edward W. Desmond, Japan's Trillion-Dollar Hole That is Making Wall Street
Nervous, TIME, Apr. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8825102, at *3 (stating that 21 of Ja-
pan's top banks wrote off $106 billion in bad loans as result of jusen scandal); Takugen
Failure Erodes Credibility of Japanese Banks Abroad, TOKYO FIN. WIRE, Nov. 20, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7745166, at *1 (noting widespread uneasiness in U.S. as result of
another major Japanese bank failure); Don Bauder, U.S. Presses Japan to Spur Economy
Through Fiscal Policy, S. D. UNION TRIB., Nov. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14534480,
at *2 (discussing letter sent by U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin to Japanese coun-
terpart urging country to repair perilous condition of its ailing banks); Asian Currencies
Weaken on Lingering Japanese and South Korean Concerns, AGENCE-FRANCE-PRESSE,
Nov. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13442113, at *2 (stating that Japanese finance min-
ister acknowledges need to curtail successive spread of bank failures).
86 See Peter C. DuBois, Salvos Over Proposed Jusen Liquidation Signal Japan's Ef-
forts to Reform, BARRON'S, Mar. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL Barron's 2813, at *302
(stating bankruptcy ofjusen is major part of Japan's banking problems).
87 See Milhaupt & Miller, supra note 83, at 19-21 (stating that financial liberalization,
lack of regulatory oversight in addition to speculative lending and bubble economy com-
bined to create jusen crisis); Action Over Bad Loan Problem, ASIAN BANKER, Oct. 1, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 14385117, at *1 (noting that jusens' bad loans led to major bailout
by Japanese government).
88 See Desmond, supra note 83, at *12 (stating that government report certified in-
adequate lending practices by jusen administrators); Toshio Aritake, Japan: MOF Panel
Fails to Deliver Proposal, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 18, 1995, at D6 (discussing banks'
inadequate risk management as one cause of jusen crisis); Toshio Aritake, Japan An-
nounces Plan for Cleaning Banks' Housing Loan Debts, BNA INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY,
Dec. 20, 1995, at D6 (contending that 30% ofjusen loans went to gangsters making them
"money of no return").
89 See Jusen Debtor Bankruptcies Reach 147 in Japan: Survey, ASIA PULSE, June 16,
1997, available in 1997 WL 10658211, *1 (reporting that jusen debts totaled approxi-
mately 1 trillion yen).
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ally forced to underwrite.90
The jusen crisis was not an isolated incident in Japan. 91 Cur-
rently, private analysts place Japanese banks' bad debt from
other unrelated real estate loans of hundreds of billions of dol-
lars.92 Furthermore, the credit ratings of some of Japan's promi-
nent banks are rapidly deteriorating. 93
Some proponents of financial modernization and deregulation
assert that the differences between the U.S. and Asian banking
practices make comparison of the different systems misleading.S4
Opponents of financial modernization and H.R. 10, however, ar-
gue that there are enough similarities to convince Congress to
maintain a separation between banking and commerce 95 and to
prevent banks from using insured deposits to engage in specula-
tive transactions.
Another infamous example of the damage caused by misman-
90 See Ostrom, supra note 84, at *3 (stating that Cabinet at Ministry of Finance
signed off on plan to cope with secondary losses absorbed by new jusen rescue organiza-
tion when it acquires $68 billion in bad loan debt from jusens); Tokyo's Big Sputter,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1997, at 8 (stating that bailout of jusen by Ministry of Finance
was only step in reformation of Japan's banking industry).
91 See Desmond, supra note 83, at *2 (stating that Ministry of Finance has assessed
official bad debt of entire Japanese financial system to be $349 billion, however, accord-
ing to experts actual debt may reach $1 trillion); Randall W. Forsyth, Take a Good Look
At Greenspan's Face, You'll See His Smile Looks Out of Place, BARRON'S, Nov. 17, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 15581360, at *3 (contending that Japanese authorities were bailing
out big banks as well as jusen and that Japan's entire economy has suffered as result of
bailouts); Todd Cromwell & Assif Shameen, Reviewing the Banks: As Japan's Financial
Sector Opens Up, Some Hard Decisions Ahead, ASIA WEEK, May 2, 1997, available in
1997 WL 10819100, at *7-8 (asserting that restructuring of banks in Japan stems from
faltering banks and bad loans).
92 See Donald R. Ciandella, Cargill Unit Prepares to Sweep Into Japanese Property
Market, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at 3 (explaining that seven year downturn in
real estate market has caused Japanese banks to be saddled with at least $300 billion in
bad real estate loans).
93 See Houtan Bassiri, Analysts are Skeptical of Japan Bank Plan, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Mar. 6, 1998, available in WL-WSJA 3471553, at *3 (noting that Moody's Investor's
Service has significant concerns about asset quality and earnings of Japanese banks);
David Thomas, Japanese Decline Likely to Continue Despite $330 Billion Bailout, FIN.
POST, Mar. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10755408, *4 (explaining that Moody's down-
graded credit rating of several Japanese banks and plans to do same for more, noting
that outlook for many banks has fallen from "stable" to "negative").
94 See Finance Service Restructuring: Hearing on Financial Restructuring Before the
House Commitee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1997), available in
1997 WL 1057122, at *1 (statement of Bill Sones, President and CEO, State Bank and
Trust Co.) (noting difference between U.S. and Japanese banking systems and stating
that U.S. model is superior).
95 See Molly Ivins, No Checks on Bank Shenanigans, STAR LEDGER (Newark), Apr.
20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3408422, at *3 (stating that Paul Volcker, former chair-
man of the Federal Reserve Board, argued that Asian Bank's reliance on mixing com-
merce and banking is one of main criticisms of their financial system).
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agement in a mixed commerce and banking system is the failure
and subsequent bailout of the French bank, Credit Lyonnais
("Lyonnais").96 In that situation, the bank used deposits to in-
vest in foolish and costly non-banking ventures that included the
acquisition of two ailing companies, M.G.M Studios and Club
Med Vacation Resorts.97 As a result, Lyonnais received a $27
billion bailout from the French government by 1995.98 Subse-
quently, the government company created to finance the sale of
Lyonnais' surviving assets required an additional $1.4 billion to
balance its books in 1996. In the end, Lyonnais benefited from
three government bailouts while the French taxpayers bore the
brunt of Lyonnais' imprudent investments.99
96 See Bill Javetski & Mia Trinephi, A $27 Billion Rescue - and It May Not Be the
Last, Bus. WK., Apr. 3, 1995, at 50 (stating that cause of Lyonnais failure was due to
problematic real estate loans, bad equities holdings and unprofitable business ventures);
see also Credit Lyonnais Arm Hire Lazard Freres to Study Sale of MGM, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 22, 1995, at B6 (stating that Credit Lyonnais took control of MGM in 1992 after
years of huge losses on its loans to studio); Lisa Gubernick & Mara Matzer, The Lion
Roars: Poor Old MGM, Once the Proudest Name in Hollywood is Showing Signs of Life
Again, FORBES, Nov. 20, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8102775, at *2 (stating that Credit
Lyonnais acquired MGM after studio defaulted on its loans).
97 See Exor to Boost Club Med Stake, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1995, at All (reporting
that Lyonnais sold its 5.42 percent holding in Club Med to Exor SA, French investment
arm of Italy's Agnelli family); Fred Kapner, France's Credit Lyonnais Met Target to Sell
1.86 Billion in Assets in 1994, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1995, at A7 (reporting that bank may
reduce 5% shareholding in Club Mediteranee SA); Stewart Toy, Can Anyone Fix France?
The Next President's Herculean Task, Bus. WK., May 8, 1995, at 46 (contending that rea-
sons for Lyonnais' decline focused on taking of foolish stakes in French companies and
making politically motivated bad loans); Troubled French Bank Concedes More Job Cuts
Needed, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4852240, at *2 (reporting
that bank expanded too rapidly in 1980s, notably in ill-fated movie, industrial and real
estate ventures); Alan R. Katz, Strauss-Kahn, EU's Van Miert Meet Monday on Credit
Lyonnais, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Jan. 14, 1998, available in Westlaw, 1/14/98 DJNS
09:33:00, at *2 (explaining that Credit Lyonnais has been assisted by France since its
expansion in 1980s left it with "mountain of bad or questionable outstanding loans").
98 See Jay Branegan, Staying Afloat-Barely the Worst May Be Over for France's
Disaster-Struck Banks, But They Still Face Ruinous Competition, TIME INT'L, June 17,
1996, available in 1996 WL 10668076, at 3-4 (stating that French government had to
spend $27 billion to bail out Credit Lyonnais, previously world's largest non-Japanese
bank); Nathaniel C. Nash, France Offers Plan to Bail Out Credit Lyonnais for $27 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at A5 (detailing of largest single bank bailout in history);
Douglass Lavin, French Bank Turns Up Heat on Lyonnais, WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 28,
1995, available in 1995 WL WSJE 2146835, at *13 (noting issuance of blistering critique
of France's multi-billion dollar bailout of Credit Lyonnais).
99 See Bill Javetski, The Legacy of Lyonnais: Debts and Doubts, BUS. WK., May 8,
1995, at 20 (stating that government company established to bail out Credit Lyonnais
needs $1.4 billion in public funds to balance its own books, underscoring notion that
French tax-payers must bear brunt of Lyonnais debacle); see also Charles Flemming,
Credit Lyonnais Shares Soar 6.5%, WALL ST. J., EUR., June 25, 1997, at 2 (reporting that
French agency, Public Establishment for Finance and Restructuring, needed additional
public funds to cover finance costs of holding company established to oversee sell-off of
Lyonnais' bad assets); France Outlines Reforms to Sales of Lyonnais Assets, AP-DOW
JONES NEWS SERV., Dec. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJE 12217511 (reporting that
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C. Domestic Financial Crises: Lessons of the Savings and Loan
Scandal
The Savings and Loan ("S&L") failures created a financial cri-
sis unseen in the United States since the Great Depression and
demonstrate dangers inherent in deregulating financial institu-
tions and permitting the combination of commerce and bank-
ing. loo Although many attribute the well-publicized criminal acts
of thrift managers as the cause of the S&L crisis, only about ten
to fifteen percent of the S&L scandal was actually a result of
fraud or mismanagement.101 Many commentators agree the cri-
sis was precipitated by risky, albeit legal behavior made possible
by loopholes created by Congress in an attempt to rejuvenate the
S&L industry. 102
state run entity formed to bail out Lyonnais was forced to reform due to losses).
100 See Benjamin J. Stein, Without Glass-Steagall, History will Repeat, BARRON'S,
Feb. 4, 1991, at 16. Stein argues that:
We have a daily spreading S&L disaster that happened when we forgot that testi-
mony and repealed Glass-Steagall for S&Ls. 'What is past is prologue,' says an in-
scription in front of the National Archives, about a quarter mile from the main office
of the SEC. We have the past available to us, but if investors and their representa-
tives are alert, it need not be prologue again. Or, it can be prologue indeed, to new
fraud, new ways for people in securities business to have another go at their captive
trustors, laughing up their sleeves behind words like 'Chinese Walls' and 'Insulated
Firewalls.' History is a nightmare from which we should at least make a stab at es-
caping, especially when all it takes is to leave the law as it is.
Id.; see also Michael Schroeder, It's Alive: Why Glass-Steagall Reviled for Decades, Just
Won't Go Away, WALL ST. J., at Al. President Reagan's efforts to repeal Glass-Steagall
were stymied by the S&L crisis. Id.; Marc J. Epstein, Accountants and the S & L Crisis,
MGMNT. ACCT. (USA), Feb. 1, 1993, at 24 (stating that S & L debacle has been costliest
financial disaster in United States history); Richard W. Stevenson, Spotlight on S & L
Crisis Over, But Bailout Tab Still Remains, ORANGE COuNTY REG., Mar. 20, 1996, avail-
able in 1996 WL 7017807, at *1 (describing scope of S & L crisis and its ramifications on
United States' economy).
101 See Bank Insider Activities: Insider Problems and Violations Indicate Broader
Management Deficiencies, available in Westlaw, GAO/GGD 94-88 (1994), at *31-49 (by
James Bothwell, Director of Financial Institutions & Market Issues). Congress requested
a study to be conducted by the GAO, which revealed that in a study of failed banks be-
tween 1990 and 1991, investigators discovered that only a quarter of bank failures were
attributed to fraud. Id. While mismanagement, including insider loans created the most
instability within the organizations. Id.; see also James Flanigan, Listen Well to
Greenspan's Warning Words, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at Dl. Renewed exuberance of
investors and their search for high yield investments should be tempered with caution.
Id. Additionally, he contends that it was the search for this type of yield that led to diffi-
culties in the S&L industry and that this was compounded by mistaken policies and dis-
honesty in government. Id.; Michelle Singletary, Justice Department Hails Prosecution at
Bank, S & L's; Report Says 3700 Senior Executives, Owners of Failed Thrifts Have Been
Sent to Prison, Nov. 14, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9272306, at *3. Mismanagement by S
& L's, rather than criminality, was the main cause of the crisis.
102 See John Grogan, Savings and Loan Crisis Catches Investors in its Web, SUN
SENTINEL, June 23, 1996, at A10 (discussing how actions taken by Congress in early
1980's designed to fuel growth of S&L's ultimately led to crisis); Franklin E. Zimring &
394 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:373
In the 1980's, Congress passed several laws that essentially
deregulated the entire savings and loan industryO3 in an at-
tempt to galvanize investments in S&L thrifts in an era of high
inflation. In particular, the Garn St. Germain Act ("GSA")104 al-
lowed thrifts to diversify their investment portfolios to include
ventures other than traditional home loans.105 S&L managers
took advantage of the provisions of the GSA, and used deposits
insured up to $100,000 dollarslO6 to enter into risky transactions
in areas in which they were inexperienced, including real estate
development ventures, construction and management of resort
hotels and buying and raising thoroughbred horses.107
Eventually, according to Senator Phil Graham, "a whole series
of dominoes began to fall;" the 1986 tax reform act eliminated
investors' incentive to invest in real estate and the crash in oil
Gordon Hawkins, Crime, Justice and the Savings and Loan Crisis, 18 CRIME & JUST.
247, 270 (1993) (discussing how S & L crisis is attributed to various factors, including
deregulation of thrifts and subsequent changes to minimum capital requirement).
103 See Steven V. Robert & Gary Cohen, Villians of the S&L Crisis Since the Mid-
Seventies, Many Officials Have Been Part of the Cover-up, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.,
Oct. 1, 1990, available in 1990 WL 3578256, at *7 (stating that President Reagan and
Vice-President Bush ushered in de-regulating campaign which allowed thrifts to imple-
ment series of accounting changes that allowed them to hide their growing insolvency
while diminishing system's integrity); Conspiracy Theories (Collapse of Savings and Loan
Institutions), ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, available in 1994 WL 1275763, at *3 (discussing
how easing of accounting rules allowed S & L's to boost initial profits but incur undetect-
able long term liabilities); see also Alan S. Blinder, The Bank Crisis and the S & L Fiasco;
Two Sides of a Bad Coin, Bus. WK., Feb. 4, 1991, available in 1991 WL 2056043, at *2
(discussing how Congress, in seeking to save then dying S & L industry, eased regula-
tions which allowed for abuses).
104 See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 23 USCA); Robert & Cohen, supra note 103,
at 8 (stating that purpose of Act was to "[liet S&L's expand beyond the home-building
business, and permit them to invest in more high-risk, high return ventures;" further
noting that Senators reflecting upon act stated "this made sense in theory but it became
a critical step on the road to financial ruin"); see also Mark D. Wallace, Life in the Board-
room After FIRREA- A Revisionist Approach to Corporate Insured Depository Institutions,
46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1187, 1256 (1992) (noting that Garn St. Germain Act laid foundation
for decimation of thrift industry as managers, no longer restrained by separation of
banking and commerce, were able to engage in super optimal risk taking, gambling on
the resurrection of industry with backing of deposit insurance).
105 See Will Charlie Keating Ride Again? Congress is Once Again Looking at Banking
Deregulation. Will it Ignore the Lessons of the Past? (Charles H. Keating Jr. and the Lin-
coln Savings and Loan Scandals of the 1980's), WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 1997 (stating
Garn St. Germain Act "deregulated thrift industry and threw wide open the doors of the
S&L's to anyone with a plausible story, a fistful of cash, and a visible desire to start do-
ing all sorts of wonderful and imaginative things with tax-payer deposits")
106 See Grogan, supra note 102, at A10 (discussing how thrift managers took advan-
tage of deregulation by investing in speculative real estate ventures).
107 See James Sterngold, Crisis?, What Crisis?, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Dec. 15, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 11511924, at *4 (stating that Congress allowed thrifts to engage in
businesses which were unfamiliar to them such as real estate, hotels and race horses).
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prices in Texas and Oklahoma plunged the S&L industry into
crisis.10S Declining land values combined with mass speculation
forced the U.S. government to spend between $90 and $180 bil-
lion to bail out failed S&L's.109
In the mid-1980's, the United States averted another financial
disaster when the government bailed out Continental Bank of
Illinois.110 Consumers lost confidence in Continental because of
bad loans"' made by the bank, which precipitated bank custom-
ers to demand repayment of their deposits.112
At the time of the bailout, deposit insurance was capped at
$100,000 per depositor.113 In this instance, however, the FDIC
extended protection to deposits exceeding $100,000, in order to
protect the bank.114 The FDIC argued that this extension was a
108 See Grogan, supra note 102, at A10 (detailing downward spiral leading to S & L
industry downfall); Jerry Kammer, Keating Wins Battle Over Verdict, is Granted a Hear-
ing on Federal Conviction, ARIZ. REP., June 22, 1996, at Al (stating that de-regulation of
industry allowed savings and loans to use their federally insured deposits in risky in-
vestments including commercial real-estate, junk bonds and currency futures); see also
Stuart Auerbach, Panel Calls for Overhaul of S & L Regulation, WASH. POST, July 28,
1993, at D3 (describing how federally insured deposits were "fundamental condition nec-
essary for the S & L crisis because it attracted investors to S & L's with hope of large re-
turns on investments with little risk).
109 See Grogan, supra note 102, at 10A (stating that total cost to tax payers after sell
off all assets was $90 billion); Eric Schurenberg, & Miriam Leuchter, et. al., The S & L
Black Hole - How It Will Suck You In, MONEY, July 1, 1990, at 68 (stating that total bail-
out of S & L crisis could total $500 billion over thirty years).
110 See Foust, supra note 55, at 156 (stating that regulators were forced to rescue
Continental Bank due to bank's funding of non-financial ventures).
111 See Continental Illinois Through Worst of Mess, S. D. UNION TRIB., Sept. 11,
1984, at A17 (noting Continental's problems started with acquisition of bad energy loans
from failing neighbor bank, with whom it had questionable ties); Continental Settles Suit
By Shareholders, NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 1986, at 53 (discussing how Continental purchased
energy loan which depreciated when oil market went into tail spin).
112 See Thomas E. Lange, The Merger of Banking and Insurance: Will Congress Close
the South Dakota Loophole?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 762, 778 n.83 (1985) (explaining
that run on Continental deposits began when investors believed rumors that Continental
would fail, as it was unable to sustain large increases in problem loans); see also Albert J.
Boro, Jr., Banking Disclosure Regimes For Regulating Speculative Behavior, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 431, 490 n.54 (1986) (noting that bailout was due to uninsured depositors withdraw-
ing $10 billion in two month period in 1984); Mark 0. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and
Branching Under the Riegle Neal Act of 1994, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 183, 223 (1996)
(explaining that Continental's huge write-off of loans led to run on deposits).
113 See William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk Based Capital
Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1365, 1393 (1989) (noting that FDIC insurance protec-
tion at time of Continental bailout was $100,000 per depositor); David Andrew Segal, A
Note to Congress and the FDIC: After FIRREA, Where's the BIF?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV.
5411, 5435 (1991) (noting that regulators exceeded $100,000 depositor insurance with
1984 bailout of Continental).
114 See A Financial Horror Story (Bank Deposits Insurance Programs Offered by
Governments), ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1996, at S17 (stating that when Continental Bank
went under in 1984, FDIC protected all depositors, regardless of size of deposit amount);
Jonathan Macy & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring and the Market For
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measure undertaken to prevent panic among bank depositors at
other institutions who feared for the safety of their deposits,
could therefore have caused similar crises at other banks.115
D. H.R. 10 Poses Significant Risks to the Banking Industry and
the American Public
The passage of H.R. 10, with its provisions allowing the com-
bination of banking and commerce, undermines the stability of
the financial industry.116 Experiences in various parts of the
world and in the United States exemplify the risk that the com-
bination of banking and commerce poses."17 The American S&L
crisis and Continental bailouts, the jusen crisis in Japan and the
debacle involving Credit Lyonnais in France, were all caused by
banks entering into imprudent commercial ventures.11 8 Another
feature shared by these banks is that their respective govern-
ments bailed them out when their investments failed, at the ex-
pense of the taxpaying public; a prospect that U.S. citizens might
be faced with upon passage of H.R. 10.119
Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1180 (1988) (discussing Continental bailout and
how it protected all of bank's deposits and general creditors from loss).
115 See Beth Kobliner, How to Protect Yourself in the Bank Crisis (Loan Agreements,
Rating Service, Federally Insured Institution), MONEY, Mar. 1, 1991, at 112 (stating that
need to bail out Continental's depositors in totality arose from desire to prevent similar
deleterious effects at other banks); Jonathan R. Macy & Elizabeth Garret, Market Disci-
pline By Depositors: A Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 215, 236 (1988) (discussing how bailout of Continental sent message to uninsured
depositors that regulators would not let banks fail).
116 See Financial Modernization: Hearing on Financial Services Act of 1998 (H.R. 10)
Before Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998), avail-
able in 1998 WL 375030, at *4 (statement of William L. McQuillan, President, Independ-
ent Bankers Association of America) (stating that concern with H.R. 10 is that it should
not encourage common ownership of commercial banks and commercial firms at time
when Japan and Asia are struggling with enormous economic and financial crises fueled
by such "crony capitalism").
117 Financial Services Restructuring, Before the House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, 104th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Jason
D. Wolfesohn, Inc.) available in 1997 WL 251124, at *9 (stating that "there is plenty of
recent experience in other parts of the world to suggest the potential problems with
banking/commerce links are not theoretical").
118 See Milhaupt & Miller, supra note 83, at 18-19 (discussing speculative ventures
entered into by jusen); Sterngold, supra note 107, at 4 (asserting that S & L's were jeop-
ardized by entering into risky transactions in areas where managers had no experience);
see also Javetski & Trinephi, supra note 96, at 50 (stating that cause of Lyonnais failure
was problematic real estate loans and non-profitable business investments).
119 See Financial Modernization, supra note 116, at *9 (noting that further IBAA
concern is that ongoing mergers and acquisitions are establishing "too-big-to-fail" entities
posing systematic risks to financial system and economy, which future administrations
or regulators will always bailout if problems arise).
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These Financial debacles were made possible by inadequate
supervision by government regulators and imprudent lending by
banks permitted to speculate in commercial ventures.120 The
safeguards provided by H.R. 10 are not strong enough to prevent
the abuses that fueled these recent financial disasters.121 The
firewall provisions that are designed to protect against impru-
dent loans between banks and their commercial affiliates have
been attacked as unworkable and un-realistic.122 Further, the
basket structure of H.R. 10, which allows the intermingling of
banking and commerce, would make it nearly impossible to
monitor the effectiveness of these firewalls.123
Nevertheless, the U.S. banking system must be modernized in
order to remain competitive within the financial system.124 Until
Congress can formulate a proposal that will protect taxpayers
and ensure the integrity of the banking system, however, the
United States is better served by its current system that main-
tains a barrier between banking and commerce. 125
120 See Gerard Baker, Japan's Banks Lose Protective Shield, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1995, available in 1995 WL 4348319, at *3-4 (detailing haphazard lending as cause of
jusen crisis).
121 See Financial Services Restructuring: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Senate
Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998), available in 1998
WL 340054, at *3-4 (statement of Ralph Nader, Consumer Advocate) (noting that follow-
ing savings and loan bank failures of 1980s, legislators made implicit promise to Ameri-
can public new risks would not be added to deposit insurance and federal safety net
without strengthening of regulation, promise that H.R. 10 fails to keep).
122 See id. at *18 (stating that great concern with mixing banking and commerce is
potential for banks to make credit decisions based on "incestuous corporate relationships"
rather than credit worthiness; "[olnce the foot is in the door, the pressure to ease the
necessary arbitrary limits, lubricated by ever larger political contributions, will grow
stronger. The fissures in the dike will erode, new compromises will be struck, and the
risks and concentrations will inexorably mount.").
123 Financial Modernization Restructuring, Before the House Committee on Banking
and Financial Services, 104th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 268302, at *32
(testimony of Alan J. Fishbein, General Counsel, Charter for Community Change)
(stating that combination of banking and commerce will result in tremendous increase in
amount of regulation to be enforced).
124 See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 977 (arguing that financial services industry must
be modernized); Lance, supra note 16, at 307 (noting that future of banking industry is
imperiled by Glass-Steagall restraints); Plotkin, supra note 7, at 404 (stating that stat-
utes are stifling banking industry and forestalling growth).
125 See More, supra note 3, at 436 (arguing against repeal of Glass-Steagall by citing
necessity of preserving barrier between banking and commerce); Halpert, supra note 3,
at 493 (stating that Glass-Steagall prohibitions are needed to ensure safety of entire fi-
nancial system).
398 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:373
CONCLUSION
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act to protect against
speculative lending by the banking industry. They believed that
this practice undermined the safety and soundness of the Bank-
ing Industry. Over six decades later, this notion still holds true.
While it is clear that the banking industry has been transformed
since the depression era act was passed, the fundamental prem-
ise behind the act remains valid today. H.R. 10 includes provi-
sions that should not be included in a financial modernization
plan. While we believe that a new plan is needed, we also be-
lieve that recent history reveals that permitting banks to engage
in unfettered non-financial activity is a mistake that could likely
prove fatal to the very financial structure we seek to strengthen.
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